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INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews decisions in the area of government contracts
published in 1992 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. This area of law governs the relationship and dis-
putes between private parties and the United States with respect to
the Government's procurement of goods and services.' The Fed-
eral Circuit's decisions in this area are based on appeals either from
the United States Court of Federal Claims (the new name for the
United States Claims Court)2 or from the boards of contract appeals
for various federal agencies.3 For the most part, the decisions re-
viewed here adjudicate contract disputes brought under the Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA),4 or precontract bid protests
brought under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA).5 During 1992, the Federal Circuit published twenty-one
decisions in the government contracts area, compared with thirty-
one in 1991. Eleven of these decisions relate to substantive contrac-
tual issues or involve bid protests. 6 Seven address jurisdictional is-
sues. 7 The other three discuss, respectively, the circumstances
1. See JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
I (2d ed. 1986) (discussing distinct rules and procedures for government contracts which
differ from those for contracts between purely private parties).
2. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (FCAA), Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 901,
106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 and 41 U.S.C.) (redesignating
U.S. Claims Court as U.S. Court of Federal Claims).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988) (specifying that Government and contractors have right
to appeal decisions of Claims Court to Federal Circuit); 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1) (1988) (de-
lineating rights of Government and contractors to appeal decisions of boards of contract ap-
peals to Federal Circuit).
4. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered sections of 28 and 41
U.S.C.).
6. Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Interstate Gen. Gov't Con-
tractors v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Modern Sys. Technology Corp. v. United
States, 979 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Stone Forest Indus. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Planning
Research Corp. v. United States, 971 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 967
F.2d 579 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Coflexip & Servs., Inc. v. United States, 961 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Andersen Con-
sulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Triax-Pacific v. Stone, 958 F.2d 351
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
7. Kiewit/Tulsa-Houston v. United States, 981 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Universal
Camera Corp. v. Stone, 975 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United
States, 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992); G.E. Boggs & Assocs., Inc. v. Roskens, 969 F.2d 1023
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under which the Eichleay formula may be used,8 whether the Gov-
ernment has ordered "exclusive use" shipping,9 and who may re-
ceive attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.' 0
On a pure numbers basis, one might conclude from these twenty-
one published cases that the Federal Circuit favors the Government
more often than not. In each of the twelve cases where the court
affirmed lower decisions, the Government prevailed. In the seven
cases where lower decisions were reversed or vacated, the contrac-
tor won. In the two cases that involved partial affirmances, the Gov-
ernment prevailed in one and the contractor in the other. Thus, an
overall scorecard might read: "Government 13, Contractors 8." It
is interesting to note that the Government was the prevailing party
before lower tribunals in twenty of the cases published, so one
might interpret the seven reversals as suggesting a more balanced
approach. Indeed, six of the seven reversals represent important
victories for contractors." Caution should be exercised in examin-
ing these results, however, because the sample for this analysis is
based only on published opinions and does not include unpublished
or per curiam decisions.
Part I of the Article reviews what has become the most interesting
and frustrating area of the Federal Circuit's decisions: jurisdiction.
Part II reviews three decisions in the precontractual bid protest
area; Part III discusses an important case on the Eichleay formula;
Part IV analyzes eight cases that address substantive contractual is-
sues; Part V reviews the doctrine of exclusive use; and Part VI dis-
cusses a case that limits attorney's fees.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdictional Problems in Appealing Contracting Officer Decisions on
Contractor Claims
In 1978, Congress passed the CDA in order to streamline and
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Ginsberg v. Austin, 968 F.2d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Essex Electro Eng'rs,
Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scott Aviation v. United States, 953 F.2d
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
8. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9. Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
10. FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
11. Contractors won important decisions on the issues ofjurisdiction, Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992); recovery of bid preparation expenses,
Coflexip & Serv., Inc. v. United States, 961 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1992); standing to sue for back
rent, Ginsberg v. Austin, 968 F.2d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1992); government liability for insisting on
strict compliance with specifications, Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); breach of contract for failure to notify a contractor by prescribed procedures,
Stone Forest Indus. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and government liability
for a change in regulations, Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1111
1112 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1109
simplify the adjudication of contractual claims against the Federal
Government arising from its procurement of goods and services.' 2
The CDA and its implementing regulations were intended, among
other things, to define what constitutes a claim,' 3 how a claim is filed
with the Government or a contracting officer (CO),14 how an appeal
may be taken from an adverse decision by a CO,15 and when interest
will begin to accrue on a claim.' 6 Jurisdictional questions arising
from contractor appeals of CO decisions, while not infrequent dur-
ing the first years of the CDA, usually involved the failure of a con-
tractor who was unfamiliar with the disputes process to fulfill some
technical requirement.' 7 In the last several years, however, the Fed-
eral Circuit has rendered decisions that have radically changed the
disputes process by altering the scope of jurisdiction of boards of
contract appeals and the Claims Court to hear appeals by contrac-
tors from adverse decisions of COs.' 8 These decisions created con-
fusion and uncertainty in the disputes process, which prompted
Congress to enact the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992
(FCAA). 19
In 1991, for example, in United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. ,20
the Federal Circuit strictly interpreted the Federal Acquisition Reg-
ulation (FAR) provision that defines who can properly certify a claim
on behalf of a contractor under the CDA. 21 The court held that if
12. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 1, at 944-45 (discussing how CDA restructured dis-
pute resolution process).
13. 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1991) ("Claim... means a written demand or written assertion
by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum
certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or
relating to the contract.") (emphasis in original). See infra notes 66-118 and accompanying
text (discussing definition of "claim" under CDA).
14. 41 U.S.C. § 605 (1988).
15. Id §§ 606, 609.
16. Id. § 611.
17. See, e.g., Beacon Oil Co., EBCA Nos. 215-6-82, 216-6-82, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
16,217, at 80,584 (1982) (dismissing for failure to certify claim to give Board properjurisdic-
tion); Sellick, ASBCA No. 27286, 83-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,198, at 80,472 (1982) (determining
that res judicata precluded Board consideration of contractor default termination); Logus
Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 26436, 82-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,025, at 79,416 (1982) (concluding that
contractor's failure initially to submit claim to CO deprived Board ofjurisdiction); Spain &
Assoc., Inc., ASBCA No. 25491, 82-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,022, at 79,049 (1982) (dismissing
contractor's claim due to contractor's failure to respond to Board's orders).
18. See infra notes 20-36 and accompanying text (discussing 1991 Federal Circuit juris-
dictional decisions).
19. Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 and 41
U.S.C.); see 138 CONG. REC. S17,252-53 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen. Heflin)
(describing FCAA's goal to clarify jurisdictional confusion for contract claims against
Government).
20. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
21. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 579-80 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991); see 41 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1988) (requiring executive agencies to
follow Federal Acquisition Regulation System as "single system of Government-wide procure-
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the proper person does not certify a claim at the time it is submitted
to a CO for decision, then the CO's final decision on that claim will
be invalid because the claim itself is invalid.22 According to the
court, defective certification, by long-standing precedent, deprives
the Court of Federal Claims or a board of contract appeals ofjuris-
diction over an appeal of a final CO decision.23
In the aftermath of Grumman, the issue of claim certification be-
came of primary jurisdictional importance and led to the dismissal
of dozens of appeals because the claims at issue were not properly
certified. The Grumman decision's new and strict interpretation of
the certification requirement overturned what had been the practice
of contractors for more than ten years. For many contractors, the
application of the Grumman standard to their cases meant loss of in-
terest on their claims and added time and expense in resolving their
claims. 24 For others it meant complete loss of the claim.25 The
FCAA remedied this situation by preventing an improper certifica-
tion from acting as a jurisdictional bar.26
In 1991, the Federal Circuit also decided Overall Roofing & Con-
struction, Inc. v. United States,27 holding that the Claims Court has no
jurisdiction to hear nonmonetary claims.28 This decision was espe-
cially important to contractors because contractors frequently ap-
peal final decisions of COs that terminate them for default.29 Until
ment regulations"); see also CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 1, at 9-12 (explaining history, struc-
ture, and purpose behind FARs).
22. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 579-80.
23. Id
24. The CDA allows a contractor to collect interest on any amounts awarded on success-
ful claims. 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1988). Interest is calculated from the date on which the CO
receives a properly certified claim. IdL Contractors who certified claims based on pre-Grum-
man practices accordingly lost interest payments for the period between their original, defec-
tive filings and their corrective refilings.
25. Contractors who failed to discover defective certification before the statute of limita-
tions had run lost their claims entirely. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2405 (1988) (setting 18-month
limitation on claims by shipbuilders).
26. FCAA § 907(a), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(a)); see infra notes
37-65 and accompanying text (discussing effect of FCAA certification provision).
27. 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
28. Overall Roofing & Constr., Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687, 688-90 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
29. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8 (1991) (discussing U.S. Government's power to ter-
minate procurement contracts for default, and consequences of such terminations). Gener-
ally, the Government may terminate for default when a contractor fails to (1) deliver supplies
or perform before a date specified in the contract, (2) make sufficient progress in discharging
its contractual obligations if the lack of progress endangers overall performance, or (3) per-
form under any contract provision. Id. When a contract is terminated for default, the con-
tractor receives no payment under the contract and indeed may be liable to the Government
for liquidated damages. JOHN CIBINICJR. & RALPH C. NASHJR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERN-
MENT CoNTRAcTs 671 (1985). When a contract is terminated for convenience, by contrast, the
contractor is reimbursed for costs incurred in performing, plus some profit. 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.250 (1991). Because of the differing consequences, contractors often seek to convert
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the decision in Overall Roofing, both the boards of contract appeals
and the Claims Court were understood to have jurisdiction in such
matters, which was a particularly logical conclusion in light of the
fact that under the CDA, a contractor can appeal a CO decision to
either the Claims Court or a board of contract appeals.30 Overall
Roofing had the effect of suddenly changing the law in this area and
resulted in the anomaly of placing jurisdiction of appeals from CO
decisions involving nonmonetary claims only in the hands of the
boards of contract appeals. In 1992, this ruling was reaffirmed by
the Federal Circuit in Scott Aviation v. United States.3' As with the cer-
tification issue, however, the FCAA remedied this illogical jurisdic-
tional rule.32
Finally, in 1991 the Federal Circuit decided Dawco Construction, Inc.
v. United States,33 a case that at first received little attention as to its
jurisdictional impact. In Dawco, the Federal Circuit held that a "dis-
pute" must exist between the Government and a contractor before
the latter can make a valid claim under the CDA. 34 Again, as with
Grumman, the court based its decision on its interpretation of the
FAR. Language in the Dawco decision has been interpreted by
boards of contract appeals and the Claims Court as requiring, as a
predicate to jurisdiction, that the parties have ceased all negotia-
tions and in some cases that the submission be entitled a "claim." ' 35
As with the Grumman rule, this has resulted in the dismissal of ap-
peals on jurisdictional grounds by both agency boards and the
terminations for default into terminations for convenience, which is in fact their only remedy.
CIBINIC & NASH, supra, at 671.
30. See 41 U.S.C. § 606 (1988) (granting contractors right to appeal adverse CO deci-
sions to agency boards of contract appeals); id. § 609(a)(1) (granting contractors right to ap-
peal adverse CO decisions to Claims Court in lieu of agency boards of contract appeals).
Before the decision in Overall Roofing, the Federal Circuit decided in Malone v. United States,
849 F.2d 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1988), that boards of contract appeals had jurisdiction over non-
monetary claims, but declined to discuss prior Claims Court cases that ruled that the Claims
Court had no such jurisdiction. Id at 1444. Because it appears logical under the CDA that
the Claims Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals from CO final decisions is coextensive with
that of the boards of contract appeals, it was not surprising that four months after Malone the
Claims Court ruled, on the basis of that case, that it too had jurisdiction. Claude E. Atkins
Enters., Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 644, 649 (1988).
31. 953 F.2d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
32. FCAA § 907(b), 106 Stat. at 4519 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)); see infra
notes 119-32 and accompanying text (discussing effect of FCAA expansion of Claims Court's
jurisdiction to cover nonmonetary claims).
33. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
34. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Facilities Sys. Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 761, 765-66 (1992)
(holding that contractor's communications to Government were invitations to negotiate, fall-
ing short of CDA requirement that for "dispute" to exist there must be impasse in negotia-
tions); Sun Eagle v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 473 (1991) (holding that disagreement
alone was insufficient and that intent to discontinue negotiations is also required in order to
confer jurisdiction on court under CDA).
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Claims Court.3 6 The holding in Dawco has much greater potential
for confusion and uncertainty than the one in Grumman, however,
because Dawco deals with the amorphous question of whether a dis-
pute exists between the parties rather than the simpler issue of
whether a particular person is the proper party to certify a claim.
1. Claim certification
In 1991, the Federal Circuit's decisions in United States v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp. 37 and United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co.,38 indicated that the court's primary jurisdictional focus
under the CDA was on the issue of claim certification. The court's
stringent jurisdictional requirements, as set forth in Grumman,39
generated dissent within the Federal Circuit40 as well as considera-
ble furor in the contracting community. 41 In response to the confu-
sion, Congress passed the FCAA, which largely stripped claim
certification of its jurisdictional implications by providing that, inter
alia, defective certification is no bar to jurisdiction before a court or
an agency board of contract appeals.42 Such defective certification
may (and must) be corrected on appeal, and a claim may be certified
by "any person duly authorized to bind the contractor with respect
to the claim." 43
In 1992, only two published Federal Circuit decisions focused on
defective claim certification. The holding of the first case, Universal
Canvas, Inc. v. Stone,44 now appears moot under the newly enacted
FCAA. Nevertheless, this case presents an interesting twist in that
the contractor repudiated its own certification and used it as a sword
to counter an adverse decision of the Armed Services Board of Con-
36. See, e.g., supra note 35 (citing Claims Court decisions dismissing jurisdiction based on
Dawco's dispute requirement); see also Hero, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 43258, 43259, 92-3 B.C.A.
(CCH) 25,048, at 124,847 (1992) (holding no jurisdiction because letter from contractor to
CO did not seek fund that was in dispute when submitted and therefore was not "claim"
under CDA).
37. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
38. 933 F.2d 996 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
39. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 579-80 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991); see also supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing
elements of proper certification under Grumman).
40. See Grumman, 927 F.2d at 581-84 (providing four judges' dissent from court's denial
of motion to rehear case in banc on issue of claim certification).
41. See, e.g., Lynda T. O'Sullivan & Mark P. Willard, Government Contracts: 1991 Analysis
and Summary, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 911, 916-17 (1991) (criticizing Grumman decision and describ-
ing movement in government contracts arena to have decision's effects overturned
legislatively).
42. FCAA § 907(a), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)).
43. Id.
44. 975 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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tract Appeals (ASBCA).45
Universal Canvas had submitted a claim to recoup costs stemming
from problems associated with government-furnished material to be
sewn into tents for the Army.46 After the ASBCA denied Universal
Canvas' claim on the merits,47 the contractor moved to vacate the
judgment on the ground that the corporate officer who signed its
claim, a vice president of accounting at Universal Canvas, was not
the proper person to certify it.48 The ASBCA denied the motion to
vacate, and the contractor appealed.49 The Federal Circuit, relying
on Grumman 50 and Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. United States,51 dis-
missed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing with the contrac-
tor that Universal Canvas' vice president was not qualified to certify
the claim because (1) he was not physically present at the location
where the contract was performed, and (2) there was no evidence
that he had sufficient "overall authority" to certify the claim. 52 As to
the second point, the court stated mechanically: "There must be
proof that a vice president for accounting has overall responsibility
before his certification can be sufficient. ' 5 3 The reason there was
no proof, however, was that Universal Canvas had failed to provide
it. 54 As Judge Cowen noted in dissent, during eleven days of hear-
ings and two post-hearing letters (one of which was written nine
months after Ball, Ball & Brosamer was decided and the other eleven
days after the Grumman decision was issued), no one at Universal
Canvas ever suggested that its vice president of accounting lacked
overall authority to certify the claim.5 5 Universal Canvas only be-
came interested in its vice president's qualifications after final judg-
ment was entered by the ASBCA. 56
The Universal Canvas decision will likely have little impact because
under the newly enacted FCAA, a contractor's error does not im-
pose a jurisdictional bar.57 Yet, although the law states that "a de-
45. Universal Canvas, Inc. v. Stone, 975 F.2d 847, 848 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 848-49.
49. Id. at 849.
50. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,- 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
51. 878 F.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
52. Universal Canvas, 975 F.2d at 849-50.
53. Id. at 850.
54. Id. at 851 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Of course, it is certainly not unusual for claim certification issues to arise for the first
time after ajudgment on the merits. The Government has often failed to raise the issue until
then. Cf United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir.) (dis-
missing claim for improper certification although not raised by either party on appeal), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
57. See FCAA § 907(a), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)) (stating
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fect in the certification of a claim shall not deprive a court or an
agency board of contract appeals ofjurisdiction over that claim,"58
it also states that prior to entry of final judgment, "the court or
agency board shall require a defective certification to be cor-
rected." 59 What if an error in certification is not discovered until
after finaljudgment? What if, at that point, the contractor refuses to
correct its certification? Can it then sue to vacate judgment because
of improper certification, as the contractor did in Universal Canvas?
The commonsense answer to this question is "no," but the Federal
Circuit's decisions in the area of claim certification have not always
followed common sense.
In the other 1992 decision on claim certification, Kiewit/Tulsa-
Houston v. United States,60 the Federal Circuit affirmed a Claims Court
decision dismissing seven counts of a plaintiff's complaint for im-
proper certification. 6' The plaintiff's claims were signed by an of-
ficer who held various titles with both Kiewit Industrial Co. and the
joint venture between Kiewit and Tulsa-Houston, Inc. named Kie-
wit/Tulsa-Houston (KTH).62 The Federal Circuit held that the of-
ficer lacked the requisite overall responsibility for conduct of the
contractor's affairs because, contrary to written agreements between
the joint venturers, he was never granted written authority to sign
certifications on behalf of KTH.63
As with Universal Canvas, the newly enacted FCAA appears to
moot the precedential value of Kiewit/Tulsa-Houston because claim
certification is no longer a jurisdictional issue.64 Nevertheless, Kie-
wit/Tulsa-Houston is perhaps a first indication that the Federal Cir-
cuit will likely apply a strict interpretation to language in the new
law permitting certification by "any person duly authorized to bind
the contractor with respect to the claim."' 65 The officer in Kiewit/
Tulsa-Houston did not possess authority to bind the joint venture,




60. 981 F.2d 531 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. Kiewit/Tulsa-Houston v. United States, 981 F.2d 531, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
62. Id. at 532-33.
63. Id. at 534.
64. See FCAA § 907(a), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)) (stating
that faulty claim certification does not deprive court ofjurisdiction). The new law was not
applied because the contractor's claim had already been appealed to the Claims Court, and
the FCAA's rules on claim certification apply to "all claims filed before, on, or after the date of
the enactment of this Act, except for those claims which, before such date of enactment, have
been the subject of an appeal to an agency board of contract appeals or a suit in the United
States Claims Court." Id § 907(a)(2), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)).
65. Id § 907(a), 106 Stat. at 4518 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)).
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and that conclusion would not appear to be changed by the new
language. What will change, however, is the ability ofjoint ventures
like KTH to authorize someone to certify its claims after the claims
have been appealed.
2. When is a claim a claim?
With defective claim certification now receding in importance, the
most significant jurisdictional question taken up by the Federal Cir-
cuit in 1992 was whether a contractor has submitted a "claim" at
all.66 In 1992, the Federal Circuit published two decisions address-
ing different aspects of this question: Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v.
United States67 and Transamerica Insurance Corp. v. United States.68 The
two cases are not entirely consistent with each other and together
suggest that the court is still struggling to present a coherent, work-
able approach to jurisdictional disputes.
In Essex, which was decided first, a contractor appealed a decision
by the Claims Court dismissing its claims for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that no dispute existed between the Government and
the contractor at the time the claims were made. 9 The contractor
had sought recovery of interest on its costs of performing three
change orders issued by the Government on a contract with the Na-
val Regional Contracting Center to overhaul and reconfigure 122
mobile electric power plants.70 The Claims Court dismissed Essex's
66. Section 604 of the CDA requires all claims against the Government to be submitted
first to a CO for a decision. 41 U.S.C. § 604 (1988). Because a claim must be filed prior to the
granting of any award, the definition of "claim" is critical. The CDA itself does not define the
term, but the FAR that implements the CDA does at § 33-1(c). See 48 C.F.R. § 33.201(c)
(1991) (defining "claim" as "a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting
parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract").
67. 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
68. 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
69. Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
70. Id. Each change order followed a similar sequence of events. The Government's CO
requested Essex to supply a cost proposal for the change in early 1986. Id. at 1577-79. Essex
issued its cost proposal shortly thereafter, which it subsequently revised. Id. The revised cost
proposal for the first change was dated April 13, 1987; the second revised cost proposal was
dated April 15, 1987. Id. at 1578-79. Each letter contained a certification but did not formally
request a final decision. Id In early 1988, the parties fixed the costs for the additional work,
at which point the contract was formally amended. Id. at 1578. Essex then submitted an
invoice for payment and the Government paid the invoiced amount. Id. The only difference
with the third change was that it stemmed from a unilateral modification issued by the CO in
which he asked Essex to propose additional repairs to the power units. Id. at 1579. Each
proposed additional repair contained a cost estimate by Essex. Id. at 1578-79. After the CO
informed Essex that the additional work could not be the subject of a claim, Essex filed suit in
the U.S. Claims Court. Id. at 1579.
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claims based on the new jurisdictional hurdles set forth in Dawco.71
Specifically, the Dawco court had held that before a contractor's sub-
mission could qualify as a claim,
[a] contractor and the government-contracting agency must al-
ready be in dispute over the amount requested [in the contractor's
claim]. Unilateral cost proposals or correspondence suggesting
disagreement during negotiations, while they may ultimately lead
to a dispute, do not, for purposes of the [CDA], satisfy the clear
requirement that the request be in dispute.72
This language, which requires a dispute to exist prior to a contrac-
tor's submitting its claim, had already been cited in numerous deci-
sions of boards of contract appeals and the Claims Court as the
basis for dismissing contractor claims. 73 The court in Dawco had
also appeared to hold that while a matter is "in negotiation" be-
tween a contractor and the Government, it cannot simultaneously
be "in dispute." 74 The Claims Court in Essex held that the three
different cost proposals submitted by Essex Electro Engineers did
not satisfy these rigid Dawco standards. 75
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court's dismissal for lack
ofjurisdiction but rejected that court's analysis, which was founded
on lack of a dispute.76 Instead the Federal Circuit found that the
contractor had not claimed its money as a matter of right, which, the
court held, is required under the definition of "claim" found in the
FAR. 77 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit did not need to reach the
jurisdictional question of whether a dispute had already arisen.
71. Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc., 22 Cl. Ct. 757, 765, complaint dismissed, 23 Cl. Ct. 573 (1992),
vacated, 953 F.2d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
72. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. See, e.g., Facilities Sys. Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 761, 765 (1992) (hold-
ing that no "dispute" as to amount contractor requested meant there was no "claim" to give
court jurisdiction); Service Alliance Sys., ASBCA Nos. 43568, 43569, 43855, 43856, 92-3
B.C.A. (CCH) 25,020, at 124,720-21 (1992) (holding that because CO never expressed disa-
greement with contractor's request for equitable adjustment, it did not amount to "claim"
that rendered decision by CO "legal nullity" from which contractor had no right of appeal);
Hero, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 43258, 43259, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,048, at 124,847 (1992) (hold-
ingjurisdiction lacking because letter from contractor to CO did not request sum in "dispute"
when submitted, meaning that it was not proper "claim" under CDA); Santa Fe Eng'r, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 36292, 92-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,795, at 123,681 (1992) (dismissing case and
holding that unilateral declaration by contractor that "dispute" existed did not make it so).
The "existing dispute" language has even been interpreted by one board to require the Gov-
ernment and the contractor to be in dispute as to the specific amount requested on a con-
structive change claim before a claim can exist. Reflectone, Inc., No. 43081, 1992 ASBCA
LEXIS 437, at *8-9 (Oct. 19, 1992).
74. Dawco, 930 F.2d at 879. This holding has been expressly adopted by the U.S. Claims
Court in Facilities Sys. Eng'g Corp., 25 Cl. Ct. at 765; B.E.S. Envtl. Specialists, Inc. v. United
States, 23 Cl. Ct. 751, 753 (1991); and Sun Eagle v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 473 (1991).
75. Essex, 22 Cl. Ct. at 764-66.
76. Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 1580 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1991)).
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To decide whether Essex had filed a claim under the CDA, the
Federal Circuit looked first to the language of the CDA.78 The stat-
ute does not define the word "claim," however. It merely states that
"'[a]ll claims by a contractor against the government relating to a
contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting
officer for a decision.' -79 To find a definition of the word "claim,"
the court looked to the FAR implementing the CDA, which states:
Claim, as used in this subpart, means a written demand or writ-
ten assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter
of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or
relating to the contract.80
Based on this language, which the court upheld as a reasonable in-
terpretation of the CDA,8s the Federal Circuit concluded that three
requirements must be met before a contractor's submission seeking
money may qualify as a "claim": "(1) the demand or assertion must
be in writing, (2) the money must be sought as a matter of right, and
(3) the writing must set forth a sum certain."8 2 Essex failed the sec-
ond of these requirements because the "claims" it submitted were
merely "proposals" for "work to be performed." s8 Because such
work was to be done in the future, "payment for any services subse-
quently approved could not possibly have been asserted as a matter
of right" and therefore could not have been claims.8 4 Dismissing
the Claims Court's Dawco analysis, the Federal Circuit added:
"Whereas, here, the first three regulatory requirements themselves
are not met, there is no need to discern whether a dispute exists." 8 5
It is unclear why the Federal Circuit adopted this analysis instead
of the Claims Court's analysis based on Dawco because, like the con-
tractor submissions in that case, the "proposals" put forward by Es-
sex were unilateral cost proposals that were not in dispute at the
time they were submitted and hence were not claims. One theory
that might explain the Federal Circuit's choice is that intense litiga-
tion before boards of contract appeals and the Claims Court over
whether there was a "dispute" under Dawco signaled to the Federal
Circuit that that decision had created a problem of equal signifi-
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988)).
80. 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 (1991).
81. Essex, 960 F.2d at 1581.
82. Id
83. Id at 1581-82.
84. Id. at 1582.
85. Id.
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cance to Grumman. Thus, the court may have begun to withdraw
from the formalistic requirements of Dawco.
On the other hand, some may interpret Essex as precluding a claim
for estimated or future costs, because such costs, until they are in-
curred, cannot be sought as a matter of right. If this is the holding
of Essex, it would cause contractors significant difficulty in pursuing
claims with ongoing costs or in pricing any claim by use of esti-
mates. Most claims are based on estimates, which is permitted by
the Government's own DCAA Audit Manual. 6 Could the Essex
court really have meant that to include in a claim any costs that have
not yet been incurred may sink the whole claim? This does not ap-
pear to be a viable interpretation because, in addition to the incon-
sistencies just mentioned, it would directly contradict the Federal
Circuit's 1991 decision in Servidone Construction Corp. v. United
States.87 The court held in Servidone that a contractor's costs, includ-
ing interest, can accrue from the date it files its claim, even though
on that date the contractor has not yet incurred all of the costs it will
later recover.88 The Servidone decision was not mentioned by the
court in Essex, however.
In Transamerica Insurance Corp. v. United States,89 the Federal Circuit
applied a "common sense analysis" to decide whether a contractor's
submission qualified as a "claim" under the CDA.90 The case ap-
pears to reject the rigid formalism of Dawco, although it does not
even mention the earlier opinion. Transamerica may therefore hold
promise for contractors struggling with the court's jurisdictional
requirements.
The claim sued on by Transamerica arose from a contract to build
an elementary school for the U.S. Army.91 The original contractor
had entered into a subcontract to construct the roof of the school;
after beginning work, however, the subcontractor realized that an
error in the Government's drawings had caused it to underestimate
drastically the cost of building the roof.92 The subcontractor in-
86. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 29, at 510-14 (describing use of estimates to compute
claim amounts). The DCAA Contract Audit Manual recognizes explicitly that contractors
often will not have maintained pertinent cost records in detail adequate to allow reliable de-
termination of actual additional costs incurred. DEFENSE CoNTRACT AUDrr AGENCY, U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 2 DCAA CoNTRAcr AUDrr MANUAL 14-2051(b), at 1428 (1992). The
manual also devotes an entire section to surveying, assessing, and auditing contractors' direct
and indirect cost estimating systems. I id., 9-1100 to -1128, at 980-1000.
87. 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
88. Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
89. 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
90. Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 1574.
92. Id
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formed a CO of the problem, but the CO considered the problem to
be the responsibility of the contractor.93 The prime contractor
then submitted a letter to the CO along with a request for equitable
adjustment certified by the prime contractor's president. 94 After
submitting this "claim," the contractor abandoned the project,
which obliged Transamerica, as bondholder, to come in and com-
plete the school. 95 Throughout this time the subcontractor contin-
ued to press the CO for a decision on its claim.96 After completion
of the project, the CO did adjust the contract price upward, but by
an amount less than the requested figure.97 Transamerica and the
subcontractor then filed a complaint in the Claims Court for the bal-
ance.98 The Claims Court dismissed Transamerica's claim from the
bench, finding that the prime contractor's letter to the CO request-
ing equitable adjustment did not constitute a claim under the CDA
because it did not specifically request a final decision from the CO. 99
In the alternative, the court found that the claim was improperly
certified.' 00
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that there is no require-
ment for a contractor specifically to request a final decision from a
CO in order for its submission to qualify as a claim.10 ' The court
held that certain "magic words" need not be used because the in-
tent of the claim governs. 10 2 For a claim to be valid, it only needs to
be in writing, be submitted to the CO for a decision, request pay-
ment of a sum certain, and give adequate notice of the basis and the
amount of the claim.' 03 Because a dispute as to entitlement had al-
ready arisen in Transamerica, the Federal Circuit had no doubt that
the contractor in the case intended to submit a claim. 104
In applying a "common sense analysis" to evaluate whether con-
tractor submissions qualify as "claims" under the CDA, the court
leaned heavily on a 1987 decision, Contract Cleaning Maintenance, Inc.
93. Id
94. Id at 1574-75.






101. Id at 1578.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Id. The court distinguished Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d
1387 (Fed. Cir. 1987), an earlier Federal Circuit decision relied on by the Claims Court, which
held that certain letters from a contractor to a CO that expressed intent to file a claim were
indeed not claims, on the basis that the contractor in Mingus had signed a release. Transamer-
ica, 973 F.2d at 1577.
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v. United States,10 5 which also applied a common sense analysis to the
CDA.10 6 The court in Contract Cleaning stated that there is nothing in
the language of the CDA that calls for a "claim" to be submitted in
any particular form or use any particular language. 0 7 So long as
the contractor submits in writing to the CO "adequate notice of the
basis and amount of the claim," that is sufficient. s08 These simple
requirements stand in stark contrast to the formalistic analysis of
Dawco.109
The court in Transamerica also made clear another point that had
originally been made in Contract Cleaning: "There is no necessary
inconsistency between the existence of a valid CDA claim and an
expressed desire to continue to mutually work toward a claim's reso-
lution."" 10 In other words, parties do not have to break off negotia-
tions before a dispute can exist over a contractor's "claim."11 This
holding directly contradicts language in Dawco, although Dawco is, as
already mentioned, not cited by the Federal Circuit in Transamerica.
The Federal Circuit did single out Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 12
however, a Claims Court decision relying on Dawco, to express its
disagreement with the notion that negotiations must be broken off
to submit a claim."13
It remains to be seen whether the Federal Circuit will expand on
the "common sense analysis" of Transamerica and thereby clarify the
issue. The issue is now more clouded than ever. Few lower court or
board decisions have seized on Transamerica's more relaxed ap-
proach; 14 cases that cite Dawco are too numerous. 115 Given Dawco's
continued viability, it appears that a contractor's submission will
only qualify as a claim if it is in writing, is submitted to the con-
105. 811 F.2d 586 (Fed. Cir. 1987).




109. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing claim requirements set forth
in Dawco).
110. Transamerica, 973 F.2d at 1579; see Contract Cleaning, 811 F.2d at 592 (finding that
letters from party seeking recompense from U.S. Government constituted valid claims despite
language in letters suggesting meeting between parties to settle dispute).
11. Transamerica, 973 F.2d at 1579.
112. 23 Cl. Ct. 465 (1991).
113. Transamerica, 973 F.2d at 1577-79.
114. One exception to this is Defense Systems Corp., Nos. 42939, 42940, 43530, 43705,
44131, and 44835, 1992 ASBCA LEXIS 419, at *4-5 (Sept. 21, 1992) (holding that contrac-
tor's submission qualified as claim). The ASBCA cited Transamerica for the proposition that
"the claims procedure is not to be converted into a game of'Simple Simon Says' where magic
words are necessary, and arcane procedure governs over basic substance." Id. (citing Trans-
america, 973 F.2d at 1579).
115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (providing several examples of lower court
decisions employing claim requirements in Dawco).
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tracting officer for a decision, requests payment of a sum certain,
and gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and
amount of the claim. The contractor must also seek payment as a
matter of right, and, perhaps most importantly, the matter must be
in dispute. Given the unresolved conflict between Dawco and Trans-
america, it is unclear whether existence of continuing negotiations
will indicate that a matter is not in dispute. Finally, the claim must
be certified, although with the FCAA in place, this requirement is
not a jurisdictional obstacle. It appears now, however, that as Con-
gress had to remedy the results of Grumman 116 and Overall Roofing,' 17
it will also have to remedy the results of Dawco. Indeed there is
movement in that regard by the Public Contract Section of the
American Bar Association. 1 8
3. Declaratory judgments
Scott Aviation v. United States" 9 reaffirmed the Federal Circuit's
1991 decision in Overall Roofing & Construction, Inc. v. United States,' 20
holding that for a claim to fall within the Claims Court's jurisdiction,
it must seek money damages presently due. 121 The Overall Roofing
decision, as with the certification issue, has been altered by the
FCAA. Under that Act, the new Court of Federal Claims will have
jurisdiction over nonmonetary claims brought under the CDA.' 22
Despite this, Scott Aviation may not be affected because under the
116. See supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Grumman, its ef-
fect on contract claim certification, and action taken by Congress in response).
117. See infra notes 119-30 (reviewing Overall Roofing, its effect on jurisdiction of Claims
Court over nonmonetary claims, and congressional response).
118. See ABA Section Urging New FAR Definition To State That Matter Need Not Be 'in Dispute,'
59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 181-82 (Feb. 15, 1993) (reporting draft revisions of FAR 33.201, not
yet implemented in C.F.R.).
119. 953 F.2d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
120. 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
121. Scott Aviation v. United States, 953 F.2d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
122. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907(b), 106
Stat. 4506, 4519 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)) (amending last sentence of 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1988), which states that "[t]he Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor arising under
section 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978," and now including jurisdiction over
"dispute[s] concerning termination of a contract, rights in tangible property, compliance with
cost accounting standards, and other nonmonetary disputes on which a decision of the con-
tracting officer has been issued under section 6 of [the CDA]").
It remains to be seen how this new language setting broadened jurisdiction will be inter-
preted. In L. Addison & Assocs. v. United States, No. 91-1388C, 1992 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS
534, at *3-6 (Nov. 30, 1992),Judge Weinstein of the Court of Federal Claims ordered addi-
tional briefing on the effect of the new law on a motion to dismiss a nonmonetary claim. Id.
Judge Weinstein posed the question whether the requirements of Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v.
United States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992), that a "claim" must seek a "sum certain"
"as a matter of right" and be presented to a CO for a decision, are still jurisdictional prerequi-
sites for the Court of Federal Claims in CDA cases. Addison, No. 91-1388C, 1992 Cl. Ct.
LEXIS 534, at *4.
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new Act, jurisdiction would still appear to be limited by the require-
ment that a CO must have issued a decision.1 23
In Scott Aviation, the U.S. Army awarded Scott a contract in June
1987 to produce protective face masks.' 24 The contract set a dead-
line that Scott did not meet, and as a result, the Army terminated a
portion of Scott's contract for default in May 1989.125 Scott chose
not to exercise its right to appeal the CO's final decision to the
ASBCA. 126 Instead, nearly a year later, Scott filed a claim with the
CO for costs. 127 Two days after that, Scott filed a complaint in the
Claims Court requesting a conversion of the termination for default
into a termination for convenience with costs. 128 The Claims Court
dismissed Scott's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that
Scott had not given the CO the requisite sixty days to issue a final
decision. 129
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that because there was no
final decision from the CO, Scott's complaint essentially sought a
declaratory judgment, over which the Claims Court has no jurisdic-
tion. 130 Although the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over
a "dispute concerning termination of a contract,"' 131 the new law
appears to limit this jurisdiction to those cases "on which a decision
of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of [the
CDA].' 1 32 In light of the fact that the CO did not issue a final deci-
sion in this case, the result would appear to be the same under the
new law.
123. See FCAA § 907(b), 106 Stat. at 4519 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)) (ex-
tending jurisdiction to "other nonmonetary disputes on which a decision of the contracting officer
has been issued") (emphasis added).
124. Scott Aviation v. United States, 953 F.2d 1377, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 1378; see supra note 29 (discussing power of U.S. Government to terminate
contracts for default).
126. Scott Aviation, 953 F.2d at 1378.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see supra note 29 (explaining different consequences of terminations for conven-
ience and default, and noting that only remedy for wrongful termination for default is conver-
sion into termination for convenience).
129. Scott Aviation v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 782, 787 (1990), aff'd, 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992). On the Government's motion for reconsideration
requesting the court to vacate the jurisdictional dismissal and to dismiss with prejudice (which
was later withdrawn), the Claims Court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice.
Scott Aviation, 953 F.2d at 1378. This aspect of the Claims Court's decision was reversed on
appeal because the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction over the cause of action and thus
could not dismiss with prejudice, as such a result would amount to a decision on the merits.
Id.
130. Scott Aviation, 953 F.2d at 1378.
131. FCAA § 907(b), 106 Stat. at 4519 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)).
132. Id.
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B. Other Decisions on Jurisdiction
1. Scope of the Contract Disputes Act
G.E. Boggs & Associates v. Roskens 13- involved the jurisdictional
question of whether a "host country contract," funded through a
loan agreement between the Agency for International Development
(AID) and Syria and later adopted by AID when Congress termi-
nated assistance programs to Syria, is a contract under the CDA.134
The ASBCA found that it was not, but the Federal Circuit affirmed
and transferred the case to the Claims Court.1 35
The original contracts, which were signed in 1982, were between
G.E. Boggs and Syria and provided that G.E. Boggs would build a
waterworks in Syria.' 36 The contracts were funded by a loan agree-
ment between AID and Syria. 137 In 1983, after terrorist attacks on
U.S. servicemen in Beirut, Congress decided to cut off the AID pro-
gram and permitted AID to adopt as a contract of the United States
any contract with a U.S. firm that would otherwise be terminated.13 8
In March 1984, the AID administrator decided to adopt Syria's con-
tract with G.E. Boggs, and Boggs agreed.' 39 The parties then nego-
tiated the amount due Boggs for termination, and, when Boggs was
unsatisfied with AID's offer, it filed a claim before the ASBCA.140
The Board found that it did not have jurisdiction under the CDA
because the contracts were not agreements between Boggs and an
executive agency of the United States Government for the procure-
ment of property.141
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that it has no jurisdiction to
hear an appeal from a final decision of a board of contract appeals
unless that decision is based on the CDA. 142 The court found that
the CDA, in turn, only applies to contracts entered into by an execu-
tive agency for:
"(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in
being;
(2) the procurement of services;
(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or main-
tenance of real property; or
133. 969 F.2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
134. G.E. Boggs & Assocs. v. Roskens, 969 F.2d 1023, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1992).




139. Id at 1025.
140. Id.
141. Id
142. Id. at 1026.
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(4) the disposal of personal property." 14 3
The contract as adopted by AID did not fall into any of these catego-
ries, and although it was a "contract of the United States," there was
no traditional buyer-seller relationship between AID and G.E.
Boggs because AID was not required to adopt G.E. Boggs' con-
tracts.144 AID's sole purpose in doing so was to mitigate G.E.
Boggs' loss on the terminated contracts, not to acquire property,
goods, or services. 145 Finally, the court found that the policy sup-
porting the CDA, which was designed to encourage contractors to
supply quality goods and services to the U.S. Government, was not
affected by excluding this type of contract from the reach of the
CDA.146
2. Standing to sue for back rent
In Ginsberg v. Austin, 14 7 the Federal Circuit reversed a General
Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) decision that denied
standing to a former landlord who had filed a claim for back rent on
a government-leased building just one day before he transferred
without reservation his entire "right, title and interest" in the prop-
erty, including tenant leases, to another company.' 48 The question
before the court was whether rights to back rent are presumed
transferred unless expressly reserved. 149 If such rights are pre-
sumed transferred, then Ginsberg, the former landlord, would no
longer retain an interest in back rent on property he sold, would
lack privity with the Government after the General Services Admin-
istration (GSA) accepted assignment of the leases, and would there-
fore no longer be a contractor under the CDA. 150 Based on this
reasoning, the CO and the GSBCA dismissed Ginsberg's claim due
to lack of standing. 15'
After concluding that no federal law exists on this precise issue,
the Federal Circuit looked to state law and other sources. 5 2 It
found these sources to be in unison: The " 'transfer of ... real
estate subject to the lease does not carry with it any right to accrued
143. Id (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988)).
144. G.E. Boggs, 969 F.2d at 1026.
145. Id. at 1027.
146. Id at 1028.
147. 968 F.2d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
148. Ginsberg v. Austin, 968 F.2d 1198, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 1200.
150. Id
151. Id
152. Id. at 1200-01 (citing state law pronouncements in Gray v. Callahan, 199 So. 396
(Fla. 1940); Velishka v. Laurendeau, 118 A.2d 600 (N.H. 1955); Williams v. Martin, 82 N.E.2d
547 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Rives v. James, 3 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)).
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rents then unpaid. These belong to the person who was the land-
lord at the time of their accrual and not to the grantee, unless as-
signed to him [or her].' "153 After finding that this rule comports
with contract law and has previously been followed by the GSA it-
self, the court adopted it as federal law and found for the
contractor. 154
II. BID PROTESTS AND BID PREPARATION EXPENSES
A. De Minimus Errors in Contract Procurement
In Andersen Consulting v. United States,155 which involved the Finan-
cial Management Service's (FMS) 156 procurement of a computer
processing upgrade, the Federal Circuit tackled the important issue
of whether errors in a procurement require a board of contract ap-
peals to grant a disappointed bidder's bid protest.157 The court also
addressed the issue of whether the Government engaged in im-
proper discussions with the winning bidder after contractors had
submitted their best and final offers (BAFOs). 158
FMS's solicitation for a computer processing upgrade required
bidders to run their hardware and software through an unwitnessed
performance benchmark prior to submitting their proposals. 159 Af-
ter submission but before the BAFO, if a bidder changed its
software, another benchmark was required.' 60 After selection of an
apparent awardee, the contractor would be required to run yet an-
other benchmark, this time with government witnesses present.161
Three contractors submitted bids: Andersen Consulting, Computer
Sciences Corp. (CSC), and Grumman Data Systems.' 62 CSC had the
lowest price by far because it used reconditioned hardware and had
technical scores above Andersen's but slightly below Grumman's.1 3
CSC was awarded the contract and Andersen protested, 164 com-
plaining of three errors in the procurement. First, Andersen argued
153. Ginsberg, 968 F.2d at 1201 (quoting Velishka v. Laurendeau, 118 A.2d 600, 602 (N.H.
1955)).
154. Id.
155. 959 F.2d 929 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
156. FMS is part of the Department of Treasury. See FEDERAL YELLOW Boox 431 (Mary
Forscher ed., Winter 1993) (listing structure and organization of Financial Management Ser-
vice within Department of Treasury).
157. Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158. It
159. Id. at 930.






1993] 1992 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
that one of CSC's software products was not "commercially avail-
able," as was required under the contract; second, FMS did not re-
quire CSC to run a second unwitnessed benchmark, even though
CSC had changed software between its initial proposal and its
BAFO; and third, prior to the government-witnessed benchmark,
CSC had not developed the capability to upload one of its software
products in mainframe code. 165 The GSBCA found these errors to
be insignificant and denied Andersen's bid protest.' 66
The Federal Circuit affirmed. 167 The Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 (CICA) states that a board "may" suspend a procure-
ment if an agency errs.' 68 "The use of the permissive 'may' instead
of the mandatory 'shall' authorizes the board to employ its discre-
tion in determining how to handle errors in procurement."' 169
Moreover, the CICA also directs boards to accord due weight to the
goals of "economic and efficient procurement."' 170 Accordingly,
boards must consider whether errors are significant when reviewing
bid protests. The court affirmed the GSBCA's conclusion that the
errors complained of by Andersen were de minimus and not sufficient
to justify overturning the award. 171
Andersen also complained that improper discussions had taken
place after the contractors submitted their BAFOs.172 At the gov-
ernment-witnessed benchmark run, the Government had asked
about discrepancies between CSC's benchmark software certifica-
tion and the software inventory list submitted with CSC's BAFO.173
CSC claimed that its error in preparing the BAFO list was clerical,
and the GSBCA agreed. 174 The Federal Circuit found this point to
be critical because under federal acquisition regulations, clerical
mistakes in a BAFO may be corrected without reopening negotia-
tions.175 The Federal Circuit therefore upheld the Board's findings
on this issue as well. 176
165. Id.
166. Id. at 931-32.
167. Id. at 932.
168. 40 U.S.C. § 759(t)(5)(B) (1988).
169. Andersen Consulting, 959 F.2d at 932.
170. 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(5)(A) (1988).
171. Andersen Consulting, 959 F.2d at 933-34.
172. Id. at 933.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 933-34 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 15.607(c) (1991)).
176. Andersen Consulting, 959 F.2d at 934. The court also distinguished Data Gen. Corp. v.
United States, 915 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1990), where the court held that the GSBCA had no
right to second-guess an agency's assessment of its true needs. Data Gen., 915 F.2d at 1552.
Here, the Board deferred to the FMS's analysis of its true needs by upholding the award.
Andersen Consulting, 959 F.2d at 934.
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B. Excessive Post-Award Hiring
In another bid protest involving computer equipment, Planning
Research Corp. v. United States, 77 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
GSBCA decision sustaining a protest on the ground that the win-
ning contractor engaged in excessive post-award hiring in violation
of the solicitation.' 78 The court, however, reversed the GSBCA's
decision terminating the contract at no cost to the Government as
beyond the Board's jurisdiction. 179
The Government's solicitation for management and support of
the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) computer facilities
required bidders to supply a steady, stable work force to complete
the contract in two years. 18 0 The Government sought to prevent
delays caused by the training of new personnel.' 8 ' Only two compa-
nies submitted bids, and the winning bidder, Planning Research,
made fallacious claims about the personnel it intended to use.18 2
After the contract award, Planning Research made numerous substi-
tutions of key personnel and openly advertised for positions to sup-
port its new contract. 8 3 The court distinguished two Comptroller
General decisions which had established a general rule that substitu-
tion of personnel after contract award falls within the responsibility
of the CO.' 8 4 In this case, the court found that the personnel
changes were so numerous and so antithetical to the original solici-
tation that they tainted the bidding process. 85 As for the Board's
decision to terminate the contract at no cost to the Government, the
Federal Circuit reversed, quoting United States v. Amdahl Corp.,186
which held that a board may determine whether a contract award is
legal but may not " 'settle the rights of a terminated contractor vis-
a-vis the government,' ",187 as this is outside its jurisdiction.
177. 971 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
178. Planning Research Corp. v. United States, 971 F.2d 736, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 737. To evaluate each bidder, EIA required contractors to submit rrsum6s for
19 key and 82 nonkey personnel required by the contract. Id. EIA also required each com-
pany to state the extent to which these employees would be used on the contract. Id.
181. Id. at 737-38.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 740 (citing A.B. Dick Co., Comp. Gen. B-233142, 89-1 CPD 11 106, at 5 (Jan.
31, 1989); Applications Research Corp., Comp. Gen. B-230097, 88-1 CPD If 499, at 7 (May
25, 1989)).
185. Id. at 740-42.
186. 786 F.2d 387, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
187. Planning Research, 971 F.2d at 743 (quoting United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d
387, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Because the Board, underAmdahl, lacked jurisdiction to order the
contract terminated, the Federal Circuit vacated the GSBCA's decision. Id.
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C. Recovery of Bid Preparation Expenses
In Coftexip & Services, Inc. v. United States,188 the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed the important question of whether a contractor can recover,
based on the Government's improper conduct during procurement,
the proposal preparation costs it incurs after submitting its propo-
sal, where such costs are not required by the solicitation.'1 9 The
court concluded that such costs are recoverable if they are incurred
"pursuant to ongoing negotiations with the government and in support
of a revised proposal."' 9 0 Costs need not be required by a solicita-
tion to be recoverable. 91
Coflexip successfully prosecuted a bid protest on a contract for a
flexible pipe system to deliver petroleum from a tanker anchored
offshore to an onshore military facility. 192 After winning the pro-
test, Coflexip submitted its bid preparation expenses to the con-
tracting agency.' 9 3 The agency allowed Coflexip to recover
expenses that it had incurred prior to submitting its proposal, but
disallowed all postsubmission costs, including $146,302 that
Coflexip had spent developing a prototype of its flexible piping sys-
tem. 194 Coflexip then filed suit in the Claims Court, which dis-
missed its claim.195
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. 96 Entitlement to recov-
ery was not at issue, nor was it contested that Coflexip had in fact
incurred its prototype expenses after submitting its initial propo-
sal.197 The court first looked at standard federal procurement regu-
lations, which define proposal preparation costs as " 'including the
development of engineering data and cost data necessary to support
the contractor's bids or proposals.' "198 These costs are allowable
to the extent they are reasonable' 99 and allocable.200 The court
found, however, that this language did not address whether post-
188. 961 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
189. Coflexip & Servs., Inc. v. United States, 961 F.2d 951, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 953.
191. Id.




196. Id. at 954.
197. Id at 952.
198. Id at 953 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 1-15.205-3 (1991)).
199. Id. at 954 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 1-15.201-3 (1991), which states that given cost is
reasonable if "it does not exceed that which would be incurred by an ordinarily prudent per-
son in the conduct of competitive business").
200. Id. (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 1-15.201-4 (1991), which states that a cost is allocable if it
"is incurred specifically for the contract").
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submission costs could be proposal preparation costs. 20 1
What the Federal Circuit found important was that the solicitation
involved a negotiated procurement. 20 2 Under the regulations for
such procurements, if negotiations are being conducted with several
offerors, each must have an equitable opportunity to submit revi-
sions in their proposals that may arise from the negotiations. 203
"Therefore, in a negotiated procurement, the costs a contractor in-
curs pursuant to ongoing negotiations with the government and in sup-
port of a revised proposal, i.e., post-submission costs, can be
proposal preparation costs." 20 4 Contrasted with these costs, the
court held, are costs that "do not support an initial or revised pro-
posal," 20 5 but rather are "incurred in anticipation of contract
award," 20 6 "in an effort to better position itself to perform any con-
tract it should be awarded. ' '207 These costs are not recoverable. 208
The Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court had erred in limit-
ing allowable costs to those anticipated in the solicitation.20 9 It re-
manded for two determinations: first, whether Coflexip had actually
incurred its prototype-development costs pursuant to ongoing ne-
gotiations, and second, whether such costs were reasonable210 and
allocable.2 11
III. USE OF THE EICHLEAY FORMULA
In C.B.C. Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,212 the Federal Circuit lim-
ited the circumstances under which contractors are entitled to use
the Eichleay formula to calculate home office overhead as a recover-
able costs claim. 213 A contractor generally favors using the Eichleay
formula rather than an established overhead rate because it means
recovering greater costs in its claims.2 14
201. Cojeip, 961 F.2d at 953.
202. Id. at 953-54.







210. Id. at 953-54 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 1-15.201-3 (1991)).
211. Id. at 954 (citing41 C.F.R. § 1-15.201-4 (1991)). Based on the plain meaning of the
regulatory definition, the court reasoned that Coflexip's prototype was clearly allocable. Id.
212. 978 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
213. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
214. Id. at 671. The Eichleay formula is used to calculate reimbursable home office over-
head costs in the event of suspension of work on a contract when the suspension decreases
the stream of direct costs against which a percentage rate for reimbursement may be assessed.
Id. The formula provides a means by which constructive daily extended home office overhead
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In September 1989, C.B.C. contracted with the Navy to build im-
provements at a Marine Corps air station, to be completed by July
1990.215 During construction, the Navy modified the contract a
number of times, and on several modifications the parties agreed to
calculate additional home office overhead at 13.94% of direct costs,
a rate that was fixed in the basic contract.21 6 On the particular mod-
ification at issue in this case, which called for additional work with
direct costs of $10,846 and extended C.B.C.'s work schedule by
twenty-four days, the parties disagreed as to the proper allocation of
home office overhead.21 7 The Navy unilaterally set overhead at
13.94% of direct costs, or $1512,218 but using the Eichleay formula,
C.B.C. calculated home office overhead at $15,317.54, or
$13,805.54 more than the Navy's award.21 9 Accordingly, C.B.C.
filed a claim, which was subsequently denied by both the CO and the
Claims Court.220
In its ruling, the Claims Court interpreted the Federal Circuit's
1984 decision in Capital Electric Co. v. United States221 as a general
rule restricting use of the Eichleay formula to situations where there
has been suspension of work, not additional work, that has caused
direct costs to be reduced or eliminated. 222 Although the Federal
Circuit held that this general rule was too restrictive, it also rejected
C.B.C.'s interpretation of the law.223 According to C.B.C., use of
the Eichleay formula should be the rule for home office overhead,
with only two exceptions: (1) in case of added work not extending
the performance time, and (2) in case of "performance extensions
involving added work equal to or greater than the original contract's
daily rate of direct costs. ' 224 Only under these exceptions would
use of the parties' agreed-upon percentage for daily home office
overhead not result in reduced payments to the contractor, because
the direct cost stream would not be lessened. 225
may be calculated using contract billings, total billings for the contract period, total overhead,
days of contract performance, and days of delay. Id.




219. Id at 671.
220. Id.
221. 729 F.2d 743, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that prime contractor is entitled to re-
cover damages for extended overhead due to contract suspension and may calculate damages
using Eichleay formula).
222. C.B.C. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 187, 191 (1991), aff'd, 978 F.2d 669
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
223. C.B.C. Enters., 978 F.2d at 670.
224. Id. at 671.
225. Id.
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The Federal Circuit reviewed in some detail the long history of
cases establishing the Eichleay formula and found a common
thread.226 "The raison d'etre of Eichleay requires at least some ele-
ment of uncertainty arising from suspension, disruption or delay of
contract performance. Such delays are sudden, sporadic and of un-
certain duration. As a result, it is impractical for the contractor to
take on other work during these delays. ' 227 C.B.C. could not meet
this "uncertainty" standard because its contract extension issued by
the Navy had involved a brief, finite period of time. 228 During that
period, C.B.C.'s work was not suspended, the company was not idle,
and there were no uncertain periods of delay.229
While it easy to see the facts of Capital Electric and C.B.C. as dis-
tinct, the former case involving 303 days of stop-and-start delay and
the latter involving a twenty-four day extension during which the
contractor efficiently completed the job, the real driving force be-
hind the Federal Circuit's decision in the latter case was its fear that
to adopt C.B.C.'s inclusive rule would mean that the Eichleay
formula would be applied to nearly all government-mandated con-
tract extensions. 230 The court found this prospect no less extreme
than the Government's attempt in Capital Electric to abandon the
Eichleay formula in all but the most limited of circumstances. 23 1 Ac-
cordingly, the court attempted to strike a balance between the two
extremes. It is not yet clear, however, whether the new element of
"uncertainty" will achieve that balance.23 2
226. See id. at 674 (citing Weaver-Bailey Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 474,
477 (1990) (stating that Government's inaccurate calculation of home office overhead caused
delay that was unforeseeable and beyond control of contractor); A.A. Beiro Const. Co.,
ENGBCA No. 5103, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,149, at 120,844 (1991) (holding that uncertainty
of delays did not allow contractor to divert resources to work); Shirley Contracting Corp.,
ASBCA No. 185-1, 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,858, at 89,399-400 (1984) (stating that Govern-
ment's inability to authorize project plans resulted in lengthy suspension of work and contrac-
tor uncertainty)).
227. C.B.C. Enters., 978 F.2d at 675.
228. Id
229. Id
230. See id. (predicting that C.B.C.'s desire to extend availability of Eichleay formula to
"pure" contract extensions would likely make formula applicable to nearly all contract
extensions).
231. Id. (citing Capital Elec. Co. v. United States, 729 F.2d 743, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
232. Although this decision is presented as flowing naturally from Capital Electric, id. at
675, Capital Electric held that the contractor needed only to show that first, compensable delay
had occurred, and second, that the contractor could not have taken on other jobs during a
Government-granted extension to recover under the Eichleay formula. Capital Elec., 729 F.2d
at 747. The Government could rebut this evidence only by showing that the contractor would
suffer no loss by using a fixed percentage mark-up formula. Id. It is not clear how the ele-
ment of"uncertainty" introduced by the court in C.B.C. Enterprises fits into that analysis. Does
it differ from requiring the contractor to show that it could not have taken on other jobs
during the extension? The court does not provide an answer.
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONTRACT ISSUES AND INTERPRETATION
A. Basic Price Agreements
In Modem Systems Technology Corp. v. United States,233 the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a Basic Pricing Agreement
(BPA) between the United States Postal Service (USPS) and a con-
tractor is in fact a binding contract.234 The BPA at issue called for
Modem Systems Technology Corp. (MSTC) to make required
changes in the USPS's phone system during a two-year period. 23 5
These changes were to be supplied on an "as needed" basis. 23 6
During the two years, the USPS never placed any orders with
MSTC, instead choosing to have its phone changes handled by an-
other company.237 MSTC sued in the Claims Court for breach of
contract, and the Claims Court dismissed on the basis that no con-
tract existed. 238 The Federal Circuit affirmed, expressly adopting as
its own opinion the Claims Court's decision. 239
In determining whether a contract had been formed, the Federal
Circuit looked at two issues: First, did the parties intend to create a
binding obligation? And second, were terms of the contract definite
enough to permit the court to determine breach and remedies? 240
In answering the first question, the court relied primarily on the
BPA itself, which stated flatly: " 'The Postal Service is obligated only
to the extent of individual authorized orders actually placed under
this agreement. Each order that the Postal Service places and the
contractor accepts becomes an individual contract.' "241 Looking
beyond the BPA, the court reviewed the Postal Service Procurement
Manual, other federal regulations, 2 42 and principal treatises and
hornbooks on government contracts to show that all are in concur-
233. 979 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
234. Modern Sys. Technology Corp. v. United States, 979 F.2d 200, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
235. lId at 201.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id at 207.
239. Id. at 200.
240. Id at 202.
241. Id. (quoting BPA).
242. Id. at 203-04 (likening BPA to "basic ordering agreement" (BOA), as described in 48
C.F.R. §§ 16.701-703 (1991), which defines BOA as agreement containing "contract clauses
applying to future contracts between the parties during [the] term [of the contract]"), The
difference between a BPA and a BOA is that ordering agreements are generally used for
larger dollar amounts. Id Neither, however, are contracts. Modern Sys. Technology, 979 F.2d at
204; see 48 C.F.R. § 16.703(a) (1991) (stating that "[a] basic ordering agreement is not a con-
tract"). A BOA also describes the "goods or services to be furnished, the methods by which
prices are determined, and the parties authorized to issue orders to the contractor." Modern
Sys. Technology, 979 F.2d at 204.
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rence that a BPA is not a contract in and of itself.243 A BPA does
not become a contract until individual orders are placed under it.244
The second issue in Modern Systems was whether the BPA was defi-
nite enough to allow the court to determine breach and/or reme-
dies.245 MSTC argued that it had a requirements contract with the
USPS.246 The Federal Circuit rejected this, 247 citing Torncello v.
United States,248 which held that if, in an alleged requirements con-
tract, there is not a commitment for all of a party's needs, then the
relationship is no different from that established by an indefinite
quantities contract with no required minimum and thus is not a con-
tract at all.249
B. Requirements Contracts
In Medart, Inc. v. Austin,250 the Federal Circuit reviewed the stan-
dard for government liability under requirements contracts. The
contract at issue between the General Services Administration
(GSA) and Medart called for Medart to supply on a requirements
basis gray metal storage and wardrobe cabinets to several hundred
federal agencies, including the military, and to ship the cabinets
around the world. 251 GSA supplied an estimate of the quantities it
expected to order, based on previous-year orders. 252 Actual orders,
however, deviated significantly from the Government's estimates.253
Medart's subsequent claim for costs was denied by the CO and the
GSBCA.254
The Federal Circuit held that under the express terms of the fed-
eral acquisition regulations,255 risks associated with variances be-
243. See Modern Sys. Technology, 979 F.2d at 204 (citing W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISrrON REGULATIONS § 16.61 (4th ed. 1986) (maintaining
that BOA "is not a contract [but] contains items and clauses applying to future contracts");
EUGENE W. MASSENGALE, FUNDAMENTALS OF GOVERNMENT CoNTRACTs 77 (1991) (stating that
"basic ordering agreement is not a contract as such"); 2 JOHN C. MCBRIDE & THOMAS J.
TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 18.70 (3d ed. 1984) (explaining that "the basic agree-
ment of itself is not a contract, and does not become a contract except to the extent orders are
issued under it")).
244. Modern Sys. Technology, 979 F.2d at 204.
245. Id. at 202, 205-06.
246. Id. at 205.
247. Id. at 206.
248. 681 F.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
249. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 771 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
250. 967 F.2d 579 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
251. Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 967 F.2d 579, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
252. Id.
253. Id. Actual orders on each one of the four stock items fell below the Government's
estimates. Id. On two of the stock items the variance between estimated and actual orders
was approximately 257o. Id. On the other two stock items, the deviation was almost 707o. Id.
254. Id. at 581.
255. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.503(a)(1) (1991) (requiring CO to estimate total quantity of items
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tween actual purchases and estimated quantities under
requirements contracts are allocated to the contractor.256 Even sig-
nificant variances from government estimates do not necessarily
mean the Government is liable for a contractor's costs. 257 To avoid
liability, the Government must act in good faith and with reasonable
care in computing its estimated needs, however. 258 The court held
that if the contractor can show by a preponderance of the evidence
that estimates were "'inadequately or negligently prepared, not in
good faith, or grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time [they
were] made,'" then the Government may be liable. 259 The court
found that GSA's reliance on previous-year orders was reasonable,
however.260 In fact, this method was specifically contemplated by
the regulations. 261 The court therefore affirmed the GSBCA. 262
C. Misrepresentation and Mutual Mistake
In Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan,263 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals
(AGBCA) even though the Board had incorrectly found that a For-
est Service misrepresentation during the bidding phase of a timber-
sale contract had not materially affected the contract terms.264 The
contractor was not entitled to any recovery from the Forest Service's
breach, the court held, because the contractor could not prove that
the misrepresentation caused it any damage.26 5 Nor could the con-
tractor recover under a mutual mistake theory, because it could not
show that the Government would have agreed to reform the con-
tract if it had known the correct facts from the outset.266
At issue was a timber-sale contract won by Roseburg Lumber Co.
through a competitive oral auction. 267 The sale area encompassed
five species of timber, one of which was white fir.26 8 Before the auc-
in solicitation of bids and under resulting contract for benefit of offerors and contractors, but
establishing also that estimate is not binding on Government).
256. Medart, 967 F.2d at 581.
257. Id
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Clearwater Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 650 F.2d 233, 239 (Ct.
CI. 1981)).
260. Id. at 582.
261. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.503(a)(1) (1991) (suggesting possible methods to estimate magni-
tude of orders, including use of previous actual order numbers).
262. Medart, 962 F.2d at 582.
263. 978 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
264. Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
265. Id at 667.
266. Id at 667-68.
267. Id at 661.
268. Id.
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tion, the Forest Service appraised the timber to establish a minimum
stumpage rate for each species of timber.269 The Forest Service may
not sell the timber for less than this minimum price, which is known
as the Minimum Acceptable Bid Rate (MABR).270 In calculating the
MABR, the Forest Service failed to subtract logging costs from the
estimated value of each species of timber.271 The Forest Service
then published these erroneously calculated figures, which compa-
nies subsequently relied on in preparing their sealed bids.272 In or-
der for a company to be allowed by the Forest Service to participate
in the oral auction, the company's sealed bid must necessarily ex-
ceed the MABR figures. 273
At oral auction for the timber, bids were made on a lump-sum
basis with the highest total winning the contract. 274 Once bid, how-
ever, Roseburg's actual payment to the Forest Service was based on
the timber that it cut.2 75 The board-feet of each type of cut timber
was multiplied by the stumpage rate for that timber to determine
the ultimate price of the contract.2 76 Before cutting, however, Rose-
burg was required to set a stumpage rate for each species of timber
by dividing its "bid premium," the dollar amount by which its bid
exceeded the Government's MABR figure for the total sale, among
the five species.277 To do this, the contractor must multiply the
Government's pre-bid estimate of the volume of each species in the
timber sale area by the stumpage rate that it sets for each species,
until the resultant number equals the total bid by the contractor.2 78
This process allows the contractor, through manipulating stumpage
rates based on its own estimate of the volume of each species, to
obtain the timber for substantially less than its winning bid.
279
Roseburg attempted to do this by allocating its entire bid premium
to white fir because, based on its own survey, less white fir existed in
the sale area than the Government had estimated. 2 0
Roseburg eventually discovered that the Government had miscal-
culated the MABR numbers for all species except white fir.28' The
269. Id
270. Id at 661-62.
271. Id. at 662.
272. Id.
273. Id
274. Id at 664. The advertised value of the bid was $930,630. Id. Roseburg won the
auction with a bid of $3,171,000. Id.
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correct numbers would have resulted in substantially altered stump-
age rates. 28 2 After learning of the error, however, the Forest Service
refused to alter or cancel Roseburg's contract.283 Roseburg submit-
ted a claim based on the difference between the stumpage rate set in
the contract and the rate that would have been set had the Forest
Service correctly calculated the MABR figures. 28 4 Roseburg's claim
was denied by the CO and by the AGBCA. 285
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the AGBCA had errone-
ously decided that the Forest Service's misrepresentations did not
materially affect the contract terms.286 Because Roseburg was re-
quired to submit a bid above the MABR numbers, error in these
numbers materially affected the ultimate contract terms.287 Despite
these misrepresentations, however, the court held that Roseburg
was not entitled to a remedy because the contractor could not prove
that it was injured. 288 The court reasoned that had correct MABR
numbers been published, the effect would have been to increase fi-
nal bids, not decrease them, because lower MABR numbers would
have expanded the profit margin on the contract. 28 9 Also, Roseburg
did not dispute the AGBCA finding that, had accurate MABR data
been published, Roseburg would have been willing to bid up to $5.3
million for the contract, almost $900,11 more than the top bid it was
prepared to pay under the incorrect numbers.290 Moreover, the
court found no evidence that Roseburg would have been the high
bidder had correct numbers been used.291 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the judgment of the AGBCA dismissing the case.292
The Federal Circuit also rejected Roseburg's alternative argu-
ment, which was based on mutual mistake.293 Two elements had to
be proven by Roseburg under this theory: first, that the contract did
not place the risk on the party seeking reformation, and second, that
the party against whom reformation was sought would have agreed
to reformation had it known the correct facts from the outset.2 94
Roseburg could establish the first element, but not the second. 295
282. Id
283. IA at 664.




288. Il at 667.
289. Ia at 668.
290. Id.
291. Id
292. Ia at 669.
293. IL at 668-69.
294. IA
295. Id at 669.
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D. Material Breach and Interest on Interest
The Federal Circuit tackled two issues in Stone Forest Industries, Inc.
v. United States.2 96 First, when is a contract breach material? Second,
can a contractor recover interest on interest due from the Govern-
ment that remains unpaid? As with Roseburg, this case involved a
timber sale administered by the Forest Service.
The original contract called for Stone Forest Industries (SFI) to
remove timber from several tracts in California. 297 Before the ter-
mination date of this contract, however, Congress enacted the Cali-
fornia Wilderness Act,298 which barred timber harvesting on four of
the tracts in the original contract.2 99 SF1 sought to delete these
units from the contract and reduce the total price, but the Forest
Service did not respond.300 SF1 then proposed cutting timber in
two of these tracts, which the Forest Service barred in writing.301
Two months later, however, the Forest Service reversed itself
orally.302 This new directive reversing the earlier bar was never
confirmed in writing.303 SFI, having cut no timber from the two
tracts in question, sought a refund but was denied.30 4 SFI then sued
in the Claims Court, which ruled that the Forest Service's temporary
denial of access to the contested tracts had not materially breached
the contract.3 05
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. First, it was clear to the
court that the Forest Service had indeed breached the contract.306
By law, the Forest Service is required to give written notice of its
decisions to permit access to tracts of timber.30 7 This requirement
was also specified in the Forest Service's contract with SFI.3 08 Ac-
cordingly, the oral notice that followed the Forest Service's written
notice barring SFI from the two contested tracts was ineffective to
restore SFI's obligation to harvest timber on those tracts.30 9
296. 973 F.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
297. Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1548, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
298. California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1988)).
299. Stone Forest, 973 F.2d at 1549-50.




304. Id The CO did permit recovery of$111,768 on the two tracts that the Forest Service
had removed from the sale. Id
305. Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 489, 492, rev'd, 973 F.2d 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
306. Stone Forest, 973 F.2d at 1552-53.
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To determine whether this breach was material the court looked
to the total volume of timber rendered off-limits by the California
Wilderness Act.310 The court distinguished Everett Plywood Corp. v.
United States,31' a case in which the cancellation of the final 6.5% of
lumber on a cutting contract did not relieve Everett Plywood of its
obligation to perform road maintenance at the end of the con-
tract.3 1 2 In Stone Forest, by contrast, 15.89%o of the timber was re-
moved from the contract, which was enough, the court reasoned, to
cause a material breach.313 As the contract was not divisible, SFI
was entitled to choose its remedy, including the option of obtaining
a refund of its deposit on the two affected tracts.3 14
The second issue, regarding whether interest may be assessed on
interest, was pressed by the contractor because the Government had
failed to pay statutory interest pursuant to the CDA315 on that part
of SFI's claim that the CO had originally allowed.31 6 The principal
of $111,768 was paid in three installments in late 1986 and early
1987, but no interest had been paid at the time of oral argument
before the Federal Circuit in 1992, a failure for which the Govern-
ment's attorney had no explanation.31 7 Although the Federal Cir-
cuit sharply criticized the Government's negligence, the court stated
that it was bound by precedent to hold that the CDA does not per-
mit the payment of interest on an interest liability.3 18
E. Waterstop Testing and Economic Waste
In an important case brought under the Wunderlich Act,31 9 Gran-
ite Construction Co. v. United States,320 the Federal Circuit held the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) liable under a theory of economic
waste for holding a contractor to strict compliance with government
310. ld
311. 512 F.2d 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
312. Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 1093-94 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
313. Stone Forest, 973 F.2d at 1552. The court included the timber from all four tracts in
making this calculation, thereby reversing the Claims Court. Id. The Claims Court initially
found that the Forest Service had only "temporarily" barred access to two of the four tracts
rendered off-limits by the Wilderness Act. Stone Forest, 22 Cl. Ct. at 495. Accordingly, it dis-
missed them from its calculations. ld With respect to the remaining two tracts, which ac-
counted for 7% of the total timber, the Claims Court found that the Forest Service's order
denying access to these tracts was not a material breach. Id.
314. Stone Forest, 973 F.2d at 1553.
315. 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1988).
316. Stone Forest, 973 F.2d at 1553.
317. Id.
318. Id (citing ACS Constr. Co. v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 845 (1982), which held that
CDA does not authorize payment on interest liability).
319. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1988).
320. 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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specifications.3 2' The court also found that the Corps breached its
duty to test the contractor's installed product and was responsible
for performance delays, although these breaches were counterbal-
anced by the contractor's failure to supply conformable goods and
its failure to inform the Government that its goods did not meet
specifications.3 22 The case thus raises a number of substantive con-
tractual issues.
The contract at issue called for Granite Construction to build, at
Aberdeen, Mississippi, a dam and lock consisting of a series of con-
crete monoliths sixty feet high, forty-two feet long, and thirty feet
wide.323 The contract required Granite to install PVC waterstop in
the vertical joints between monoliths to prevent water leakage.324
After ten percent of the waterstop was permanently embedded in
the monoliths, the Corps tested the waterstop, decided it failed to
meet contract specifications, and ordered all of it removed and
replaced.3 25
The noncomplying waterstop had been supplied by Granite's sub-
contractors in two deliveries.3 26 Initially, the Corps had tested four
samples from the first batch of waterstop and informed Granite that
it met the Corps' specifications. 327 No other testing had been per-
formed until after Granite had installed a significant amount of
waterstop in the concrete.3 28 The incident that prompted Granite
to check the waterstop further was a different coloration in the sec-
ond batch.3 29 When the Corps finally tested that batch, four of five
samples failed specifications.330
Subsequent to its removal of the noncomplying waterstop, Gran-
ite recovered $400,11 from two subcontractors and obtained a de-
fault judgment for $894,750 from two other subcontractors. 33'
Granite then filed a claim for $3.8 million with the CO.33 2 On ap-
peal, the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals held a trial
321. Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Wunderlich Act applied in this case because Granite entered the contract with the Govern-
ment prior to the effective date ofthe CDA, and Granite had not elected CDA coverage. Id. at
1000.
322. Id at 1006.
323. Id. at 1000.
324. Id.
325. Id.





331. Id. at 1000.
332. Id.
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on liability and denied Granite's claim in its entirety.333 Granite ap-
pealed this decision to the Claims Court, which dismissed it on a
motion for summary judgment.334 The Claims Court's dismissal
was appealed to the Federal Circuit. 335
The Federal Circuit first addressed whether the Corps was liable
for its failure to test the waterstop periodically. Based on several
clauses in the contract, the court held that the Government was re-
sponsible for testing the waterstop but that those technical provi-
sions did not relieve Granite of its duty to supply waterstop meeting
contract specifications. 336 Because Granite supplied nonconform-
ing material, it was not entitled to recover direct costs of removing
and replacing the defective waterstop. 337 The court noted that the
Corps should be responsible for performance delays attributable to
an unreasonable failure to test the waterstop, but it declined to hold
the Corps liable on the contract because Granite had affirmatively
represented to the Government that the waterstop conformed to
specifications. 338 Several certifications received from Granite's sup-
pliers and passed on to the Government had misled the Corps into
believing that the waterstop met specifications. 339 Once this belief
was challenged by the appearance of the waterstop differing from
the original batch, the Corps promptly undertook tests and discov-
ered the nonconforming waterstop.3 40 On this basis, the court
found that the Government acted reasonably and therefore should
not be held liable for performance delays.3 41
The second issue addressed by the Federal Circuit was whether
the Corps was responsible for requiring Granite to remove and re-
place all the implanted waterstop for failure to meet specification.3 42
Prior to removal, Granite proposed several remedial measures that
did not require replacement of the waterstop.3 43 Although Granite
admitted that the waterstop embedded in ten percent of the dam did
not literally meet specifications, the contractor contended that this
type of waterstop was more than adequate for its required use.344
333. Id
334. Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 831, 832, rev'd, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed.
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 965 (1993).
335. Granite Constr., 962 F.2d at 1000.
336. Ide at 1002-04.




341. Id. at 1004.
342. It at 1004-05.
343. It. at 1005.
344. Id
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Granite was unsuccessful, however, in persuading the Government
to accept the installed waterstop at a reduced price.3 45
The Federal Circuit found that the Government's insistence on
complete waterstop removal, without any evaluation of the technical
necessity for rework, was arbitrary and capricious.3 45 The contrac-
tor had submitted evidence from an expert who testified that the
installed waterstop exceeded the actual needs of the Aberdeen dam
and lock project, and the Government offered no rebuttal.3 47 The
court therefore reversed the Board's finding that Granite had failed
to prove substantial compliance with waterstop specifications as not
supported by substantial evidence.3 48
Relying on the doctrine of economic waste, the Federal Circuit
held that the Government is liable for ordering replacement work in
situations where the cost of correction is economically wasteful and
the work is otherwise adequate for its intended purpose.349 In such
circumstances, the Government is only entitled to a downward ad-
justment in the contract price.350 Accordingly, the court held that
Granite was entitled to an equitable adjustment for costs of remov-
ing and replacing the waterstop based on the Government's con-
structive change in the contract.35' The court added, however, that
Granite's recovery against the Government must be reduced by the
reasonable cost the contractor would have incurred if it had been
permitted to repair the waterstop in the way it had originally
suggested.3 52
F. Responsibility for Delay Costs
In Triax-Pacific v. Stone,353 the Federal Circuit affirmed an ASBCA
decision dismissing a contractor's claim for delay costs on a housing
improvements contract.3 54 The contract was divided into three
phases, 355 with phase I to start ten days after Triax received a notice
to proceed and phase II to start within sixty days of the notice to
proceed on phase j.356 Triax was sixty days late in completing work
345. Id at 1004.
346. Id at 1005.
347. Id at 1005-06.
348. Id
349. Id at 1007.
350. Idt at 1007-08.
351. Id at 1008.
352. Idt
353. 958 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
354. Triax-Pacific v. Stone, 958 F.2d 351, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
355. Idt at 352 (stating that Triax was required in all three phases to commence work
within 10 days of receiving notice to proceed from Government).
356. Idt
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on an earlier contract,357 which meant that families living in phase II
housing had nowhere to move until Triax completed its work.35 8 As
a result, the Government did not notify Triax to begin work on
phase II until fifty-three days after the deadline in the contract.3 59
Triax submitted a certified claim for additional costs caused by the
delay, which the Board subsequently denied, finding that the Gov-
ernment's delay was Triax's fault.36 0
The Federal Circuit, citing Johnson & Sons Erectors Co. v. United
States,36' first held that Triax could not support a breach of contract
claim where the contract contained provisions for equitable adjust-
ment.36 2 Nor could Triax support its argument that the contract's
"Changes" clause applied, because the late issuance of the Govern-
ment's notice resulted in a delay of work rather than a change of
work.3 63 For Triax to recover, it was required to proceed under the
"Suspension of Work" clause of the contract. 36 To recover under
the "Suspension of Work" clause, however, a contractor must show
that "the government's actions are the sole proximate cause of the
contractor's additional loss, and the contractor would not have been
delayed for any other reason during that period. '3 65 In this case,
Triax, by running sixty days late on its earlier contract, was at least
partially the cause for the Government's delay because work on
phase II could not begin until all families were vacated from that
housing.366 Accordingly, Triax could not recover for the delay.3 67
Finally, Triax argued that it had already compensated the Govern-
ment for its earlier delay by paying liquidated damages and that to
prevent it from recovering for the phase II delay would be to penal-
ize it twice. 368 The court rejected this argument for two reasons.
First, Triax's payment for its earlier delay did not excuse it from
acting as a cause of the later delay, and second, if Triax were al-
357. Id at 352 (requiring Triax to pay $33,335 in liquidated damages for this late work).
358. Id at 353.
359. Id.
360. Triax-Pacific, ASBCA No. 3653, 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,724, at 118,747 (1991),
aft'd, 958 F.2d 351 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
361. 231 Ct. Cl. 753, 757-58 (holding that contract clauses providing for equitable adjust-
ments remove contractor's obligation to declare contract at end and cease performance to
avoid waiver and save its rights, but limitihg breach of contract claims to equitable adjustment
solely), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
362. Triax-Pacific, 958 F.2d at 353-54.
363. Id. at 354.
364. Id.
365. Id. The suspension clause stated that the contractor would not be entitled to an
equitable adjustment" 'to the extent that [the contractor's] performance would have been so
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lowed to recover for the phase II delay, this might cancel out the
liquidated damages paid on the earlier contract.3 69
G. Patent Ambiguity in a Contract
In Interstate General Government Contractors, Inc. v. Stone,370 the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed an award of summary judgment denying a con-
tractor's claim for equitable adjustment because the contractor had
failed to seek clarification of an ambiguity in the contract before it
bid on and won the job.3 71 The contract required Interstate Gen-
eral Government Contractors (IGGC) to replace heating and air-
conditioning equipment and install an air-handling system in three
buildings at Fort Gordon, Georgia.3 72 After winning the job but
prior to installation, IGGC submitted a material approval list to the
Government that indicated its intent to use conventional motor
starters in the air-handling system instead of more expensive varia-
ble-speed fan power controllers (VSPCs).3 7 3 The CO rejected this
approach and informed IGGC that the more expensive VSPCs were
required under the contract.3 74 Accordingly, IGGC installed VSPCs
at an additional cost of $48,186 and then filed a claim for equitable
adjustment in this amount.3 75 The ASBCA granted summary judg-
ment on the claim to the Government, concluding that the contract
called for VSPCs.3 76
On appeal, IGGC argued that the contract made numerous refer-
ences to both motor starters and VSPCs and was therefore ambigu-
ous. 377 Because an ambiguity in a contract should be construed
against its drafter, in this case the Government, and because IGGC's
use of motor starters was reasonable, IGGC argued that it should
prevail.3 78 The Government countered that the contract unequivo-
cally called for VSPCs to be used.3 79
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA, but on different
grounds.380 The court disagreed with the Board's factual conclu-
369. Id.
370. 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
371. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434 (Fed. Cir.
1992).




376. Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 42742, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 1
24,280, at 121,370 (1991), aft'd, 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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sion that VSPCs were required and found instead that the contract
was ambiguous.3 81 Under such circumstances, IGGC normally
would have won because an ambiguity must be construed against
the drafter, and a reasonable interpretation followed by the contrac-
tor must succeed.38 2 IGGC did not win, however, because the Fed-
eral Circuit applied an exception to that rule, which provides that
where an ambiguity in a contract is patent, the contractor has a duty
to inquire of the CO the true meaning of the contract prior to sub-
mitting its bid.383 In light of the fact that IGGC did not attempt to
clarify whether motor starters or VSPCs were required before it sub-
mitted its bid, it could not recover after the contract had been
awarded.38 4 The court, citing Beacon Construction Co. v. United
States,385 held that the contract was patently ambiguous because a
reasonable finder of fact, viewing the contract as a whole, could not
find that references to motor starters and VSPCs were intended to
refer to the same type of device.38 6
The court's approach in this case, while seemingly straightfor-
ward, may leave contractors in a difficult situation. Although the
Federal Circuit considered this contract to be patently ambiguous,
neither the CO nor the ASBCA found the contract to be ambiguous,
much less patently ambiguous.38 7 Because a contractor cannot cor-
rect its failure to inquire about patent ambiguities after bidding, it
must err on the side of inquiry prior to submitting its bid.
H. Government Responsibility for Change in Regulation
In Hills Materials Co. v. Rice,388 the Federal Circuit reversed an
ASBCA decision that had upheld the Government's interpretation
of two clauses in an excavation contract: the accident prevention
clause, and the permits and responsibilities clause.38 9 The contro-
versy arose when, after contract award, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) issued final regulations that sub-
381. Id.
382. Id. (citing United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1402, 1407 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
383. Id. (citing Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
1985), and Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d 647, 649 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
384. Id. at 1435.
385. 314 F.2d 501, 504 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (finding that patent ambiguity can be in form of
"obvious omission, inconsistency or discrepancy of significance").
386. Interstate Gen., 980 F.2d at 1435.
387. See Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 42742, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
24,280, at 121,370 (1991), aft'd, 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that specifica-
tions on contract drawings indicated that only VSPCs were required and that contractor
should not receive equitable adjustment for supplying both VSPCs and motor starters).
388. 982 F.2d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
389. Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 516-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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stantially changed 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652 governing the grading and
sloping of ditches.390 This change caused Hills Materials to under-
take extensive unanticipated excavation efforts to complete its con-
tract.391 Hills Materials filed a request for equitable adjustment, and
later a formal claim, to recoup its additional costs, but these re-
quests were denied by the CO and ASBCA.392
The issue in the case was which party should assume liability for
the extra costs associated with the changed OSHA regulations. Res-
olution of this question hinged on an interpretation of two clauses
in the contract. The accident prevention clause required the con-
tractor to " '[c]omply with the standards issued by the Secretary of
Labor at 29 CFR part 1926.' "393 The permits and responsibilities
clause provided that " 'the Contractor shall, without additional ex-
pense to the Government, be responsible for obtaining any neces-
sary licenses and permits, and for complying with any Federal, State,
and municipal laws, codes, and regulations applicable to the per-
formance of the work.' "394
The contractor argued that the word "issued" was used in the
past tense, and thus the accident prevention clause only obligated
Hills Materials to meet the OSHA regulations in effect at the time
the contract was awarded, not those that might be "issued" in the
future.3 95 The Government countered that the permits and respon-
sibilities clause required Hills Materials to comply with any changes
in federal, state, or local law, including changes "issued" in connec-
tion with OSHA's ditch and trench regulations at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.652.396 The Federal Circuit concluded that both interpreta-
tions of the contract were reasonable.3 97
Faced with two "reasonable" but different interpretations of the
contract, the court held that the contract was ambiguous, and ap-
plied the longstanding rule of contractual interpretation known as
contra proferentum that construes an ambiguous term against its
drafter, in this case the Government.398 The court also held that the
ambiguity was "latent," not "patent," and thus Hills Materials had
no duty to ask for clarification.3 99 Accordingly, the court upheld
390. Id. at 515 & n.1.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 516 (emphasis supplied by appeals court) (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-13(a)(2)
(1992)).
394. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-7 (1992)).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id at 516-17.
398. Id.
399. Id at 516 & n.3. For a discussion of "patent" ambiguities, see supra notes 370-87
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Hills Materials' interpretation of the contract and remanded for a
calculation of its equitable adjustment.40 0
The interesting point about Hills Materials is the manner in which
its outcome was reached. The contractor's argument, that "issued,"
if given its plain meaning, would stand only for the past tense,
seems somewhat stretched. The word "issued" by itself does not
indicate whether it refers to something that has been issued or will
be issued. Nevertheless, based on nothing more than a simple rule
of contract interpretation, the Federal Circuit concluded that "is-
sued" had been used in the contract to refer only to the past
tense.401 This case illustrates how the Federal Circuit can use a rule
of contract interpretation to reach a fair result.
V. EXCLUSIVE USE
In Baggett Transportation Co. v. United States,40 2 the Federal Circuit
helped define what specific language must be stated before the Gov-
ernment is conclusively understood to have requested "exclusive
use" of a shipper's containers to transport government property. 40 3
Where exclusive use is requested, a carrier may charge a higher rate
because it is shipping only partially filled containers or trucks.40 4 In
Baggett, the carriers had initially shipped the government's goods
without charging for exclusive use, but more than a year later, they
submitted supplemental bills that included the extra charge. 40 5 The
Government refused to pay, and the matter ended up in the Claims
Court, which rejected the shippers' claims.40 6 The Claims Court
held that for exclusive-use charges to apply, there must be some evi-
dence that exclusive use was in fact performed, and there must be
"substantial compliance" with the tender40 7 or tariff40 8 by annotat-
ing the bill of lading4 °9 to request exclusive use.4 10
and accompanying text (describing Interstate Gen. Gov't Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d
1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992), which held that ambiguity must be construed against drafter).
400. Hills Materials, 982 F.2d at 517.
401. Id. at 516.
402. 969 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
403. Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1029-30.
406. Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 263, 275-76, aff'd, 969 F.2d 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
407. Idt at 271 (stating that "tender" is carrier's continuing offer to perform transport
services for stated prices).
408. It (explaining that "tariff" sheet is on file with Interstate Commerce Commission,
sets forth carrier's rates, and is incorporated by reference in "tender").
409. Id. (explaining that "bill of lading," issued by Government, is often annotated with
instructions to carrier).
410. Id. at 270.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. The main question was
whether the following notation, which appeared on the Govern-
ment's bills of lading, amounted to a request for exclusive use:
SHIPPER SEAL(S) APPLIED. CARRIER MAY REMOVE
SEAL(S) AND REPLACE WITH EQUIVALENT SEAL(S) ON
PRIOR CONSENT OF CONSIGNOR. IF SEALS ARE BROKEN
IN EMERGENCIES, NOTIFY CONSIGNOR AS SOON AS POS-
SIBLE. CARRIER MUST ANNOTATE SEAL CHANGES ON
[BILL OF LADING]. APPLICATION OF SHIPPER SEALS
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REQUEST FOR EXCLUSIVE USE
OF VEHICLE/CONTAINER. 4 11
The court distinguished this bill of lading notation from ones in-
volved in a Court of Claims case, Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United
States,412 and a decision of the Comptroller General, American Farm
Lines, Inc. 413 In both cases, the Government had attached notations
with the language "DO NOT BREAK SEALS" to the bills of lad-
ing.41 4 This language was not considered significant in Campbell be-
cause three of four bills of lading also specifically stated: "Exclusive
Use of Vehicle Requested By The Government. ' 41-5 The fourth
omitted that language, but had a certificate attached to it, to be
signed by the carrier, certifying that "Exclusive Vehicle Service" was
used.416 The court in Campbell held that all four bills of lading re-
quired exclusive use because each contained "some written nota-
tion, which reasonably apprises the carrier that the shipper is
requesting the exclusive use of its vehicle. ' 41 7 In American Farm
Lines, the Comptroller General held that the "DO NOT BREAK
SEALS" language amounted to a request for exclusive use because
the language reasonably apprised the carrier that "exclusive use"
was what the shipper wanted.418 After the decision in American Farm
Lines, however, the Government replaced the "DO NOT BREAK
SEALS" language with the notations in question in Baggett.4 19
The Federal Circuit rejected the appellants' claim in Baggett for
411. Baggett Transp., 969 F.2d at 1030.
412. 302 F.2d 270 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
413. Nos. B-203805, B-204113, 1981 WL 22956 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 24, 1981).
414. Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 270 (Ct. Cl. 1962); American
Farm Lines, Inc., Nos. B-203805, B-204113, 1981 WL 22956 at *2 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 24,
1981).
415. Campbell "66" Express, 302 F.2d at 272.
416. Id.
417. Id. With respect to the fourth bill of lading, the Court of Claims held that even
though a tariff provision required the statement "exclusive use of vehicle requested" to be on
the bill of lading, and it was not there, this provision was not to be read to exclude other
language that reasonably apprised the carrier that exclusive use was requested. Id
418. American Farm Lines, Nos. B-203805, B-204113, 1981 WL 22956 at "2-3.
419. Baggett Transp., 969 F.2d at 1031.
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three reasons. First, there was no statement on the bill of lading
requesting exclusive use; second, the bill of lading stated explicitly
that "application of shipper seals does not constitute a request for
exclusive use"; and third, the carriers obviously did not believe that
the bill of lading called for exclusive use because they had consist-
ently billed the Government at the regular rate.420 The court held,
moreover, that the mere fact that the Government uses cable seal
locks and wire twist seals is not significant because the substantial
compliance test requires written notation on the bill of lading.421
VI. ATrORNEY'S FEES
FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States422 presented two issues. First,
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),423 which party re-
ceives an award of attorney's fees, the client or the attorney? Sec-
ond, may interest be collected under the Prompt Payment Act424 on
late payment of attorneys' fees? The court strictly construed the
language of § 504(a)(1) of the EAJA4 2 5 to hold that the "prevailing
party," not the prevailing party's attorney, is entitled to receive fee
awards. 426 On this point, Judge Newman filed a sharp dissent.427
On the second issue, the court held that because attorney's fees are
not "property or service" under the Prompt Payment Act, interest
may not be recovered on their delayed payment. 428
The case arose when the Army terminated a contract for default
with FDL Technologies. 429 The ASBCA ruled the Army's action im-
proper in May 1990, and, as prevailing party, FDL submitted a claim
under the EAJA for $26,731.59 in attorney's fees and costs. 43 0 FDL
subsequently filed for bankruptcy inJuly 1990.431 The Army did not
420. Id. at 1032-33.
421. Id. The court rejected the contention that the use of cable seal locks and wire twist
seals amounted to a constructive request by the Government for exclusive use, which is a
more expensive means of shipping, and stated that a written notation that reasonably apprises
the carrier of the shipper's request for exclusive use is necessary. Id.
422. 967 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
423. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
424. 31 U.S.C. §9 3901-3907 (1988).
425. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988) (requiring that agency conducting adversary proceed-
ing must award to prevailing party, other than United States, fees and expenses incurred in
relation to proceeding).
426. FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
427. Id. at 1582-86 (Newman, J., dissenting); see infra notes 449-51 (preferring common-
sense approach to statutory construction as encouraging meritorious suits).
428. Id. at 1579; see 31 U.S.C. § 3902(a) (1988) (requiring that "head of an agency acquir-
ing property or service from business concern, who does not pay this concern for each com-
plete delivered item of property or service by required payment date, shall pay interest
penalty to the concern on the amount of the payment due").
429. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1579.
430. Id. (noting that FDL filed claim under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)).
431. Id.
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contest the fees-and-costs application.43 2 In September 1990, the
CO issued a contract modification to increase the contract price by
the requested amount, and, because of this informal change, the
ASBCA never issued an order awarding attorney's fees.433 When
payment of the money was not forthcoming, FDL filed a complaint
in the Claims Court in November 1990. 43 4 The Army asserted that
it issued a check to FDL in December 1990.435 This check was not
cashed, however, and the Army issued a new check in June 1991.436
The Claims Court rejected FDL's claim that the money should have
been paid directly to FDL's attorney.43 7 It also denied interest on
the payment.438
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court. Inter-
preting the EAJA, the majority relied on the language of
§ 504(a)(1), stating: " 'An agency that conducts an adversary adju-
dication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United
States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection
with that proceeding .... , -439 By its plain language, the court held,
the statute indicates that the prevailing party, not that party's attor-
ney, is entitled to fees.440 The majority also relied on its 1991 opin-
ion in Phillips v. General Services Administration,44 1 which construed a
different provision of the EAJA, 4 4 2 to reach the same result.443 Fi-
nally, the majority distinguished a 1988 Federal Circuit opinion,Jen-
sen v. Department of Transportation,444 where it had held that an
attorney's fees award under the Civil Service Reform Act 445 must be
paid to counsel.446 Not only were the facts of that case different in






437. FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 484, 484, aft'd, 967 F.2d 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
438. Id.
439. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1580 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)).
440. Id.
441. 924 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
442. See Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
that fee award is payable to prevailing party, and that under EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(1988), prevailing party's attorney cannot directly claim or be entitled to award).
443. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1580. In a footnote, the majority opinion distinguished
the holding by the Federal Circuit in Phillips that required Phillips to turn the fee award over
to her attorney, Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1582, as being an interpretation of a fee arrangement
between Phillips and her attorney and not an interpretation of the EAJA. FDL Technologies,
967 F.2d at 1580 n.1.
444. 858 F.2d 721 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
445. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988).
446. Jensen v. Department of Transp., 858 F.2d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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for his attorney's waiving part of the fee,4 4 7 but the language of the
statute was different as well, providing that "the Board ... may re-
quire payment by the agency involved of reasonable attorney fees
incurred by an employee ... if the employee.., is the prevailing
party." 448
Judge Newman, in dissent, took sharp exception to the majority's
splitting-hairs approach. In her view, the most important considera-
tion is an equitable one, namely that the purpose of the statute is to
encourage members of the bar to take on meritorious suits even
though the client may be in precarious financial condition. 449 The
equities in this case weighed strongly in favor of the attorney's re-
covering, because denying him or her recovery permits a party that
did not incur the fees, i.e., the trustee in bankruptcy, to reap a
"windfall. '450 Newman argued that courts have consistently used a
common sense approach and directed that fees be paid to the attor-
ney when the circumstances show that an improper windfall would
otherwise result.45 1
On the second issue, the Federal Circuit held that FDL was not
entitled to interest on its attorney's fees award.452 The Prompt Pay-
ment Act requires interest on late payment "for each complete de-
livered item of property or service" purchased from a business
concern. 453 The majority concluded that the terms "property or
service" do not include attorney's fees.454
CONCLUSION
In the private sector, it is a fundamental principle of contract law
that legitimate expectations of parties should be honored.455 Re-
447. Id.
448. Id. at 723 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988)).
449. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1582 (Newman, J., dissenting).
450. Id. at 1582-83.
451. See id (citingJensen v. Department of Transp., 858 F.2d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1988))
(stating that attorney's fees awarded under Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1)
(1988), must be paid directly to attorney to assure that attorney receives fees and that others
do not receive unearned windfall); Rodriguez v. Taylon, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977)
(explaining that because object of fee awards is not to provide windfall to individual plaintiffs,
fee awards must accrue to counsel), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Brandenburger v.
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that attorney's fees awarded in 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action shall be paid directly to legal services organization to avoid windfall to
litigant)).
452. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1581.
453. 31 U.S.C. § 3902(a) (1988).
454. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1581. The court also noted that interest cannot be
recovered against the Government unless such a remedy has been specifically provided for by
Congress. Id.
455. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) (concluding that expecta-
tion interest of party to contract requires, in case of breach, that nonbreaching party receive
1153
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grettably, in the government contracts arena, the Federal Circuit
seems to proceed on a directly contrary principle. Time and again,
the Federal Circuit has come up with new readings of statutes and
regulations that run counter to legislative intent, to parties' long-
standing expectation and reliance interests, and even to the Federal
Circuit's own prior decisions. Even when there exists a clear state-
ment of policy by Congress, the Federal Circuit has adopted con-
trary, and counterintuitive, interpretations of statutory language.
Many practitioners have suggested that the problem may stem from
the Federal Circuit's lack of significant government contracts back-
ground and experience.
Recent Federal Circuit decisions have been particularly damaging
with regard to the issue of jurisdiction over appeals from COs' final
decisions under the CDA. Government contractors who have filed
claims in accordance with well-established practice often find that
their claims are dismissed for failing to comply with novel and
highly technical jurisdictional requirements that have little to do
with discernible congressional intent. Despite Congress' clear goal
of making appeals available whenever common sense would con-
clude that there is a "claim," the Federal Circuit has studded the
field with landmines that are traps not only for the unwary, but for
the experienced practitioner as well.
benefit of bargain by being put in as good position as would have been in if contract had been
performed).
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